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ABSTRACT
The formulation and implementation of public policy depends on the 
coordination capacities. In recent decades the need for coordination 
has increased due to the fragmentation caused by NPM reforms, 
decentralisation processes, the proliferation of the cross-cutting issues, as 
well as increased globalisation, Europeanisation, and professionalization. 
The coordination problem in Croatian administration, similarly to other 
transition countries, is critically important but understudied. This paper 
is based on a preliminary research on coordination in Croatian public 
administration with regard to policy formulation and implementation of 
three policies – regional development policy, anticorruption policy and 
e-government policy, based on the interviews conducted with higher civil 
servants and public officials. A special emphasis is given to the role which 
various actors play in coordination, as well as the structures Government 
employs in order to coordinate. The research shows that the development 
of coordination instruments in Croatia suffers from inefficiencies and is 
greatly influenced by politically driven considerations.
Keywords: coordination, public policy, anti-corruption policy, e-government policy, 
regional development policy 
JEL: H11, H83
1 Introduction1
The problem of coordination in public administration is a well known and 
constant concern of both scholarly literature and practice. The processes of 
fragmentation of state administration, political decentralisation as well as 
increased international cooperation within the framework of globalisation 
and Europeanisation have increased the problem of coordinating public 
1	 The	 first	 version	 of	 the	 paper	was	 presented	 at	 the	 RC	 27	 Structure	 and	Organization	 of	
Government,	22nd	IPSA	World	Congress,	8–12	July	2012,	Madrid,	Spain.
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policies and attaining the goals of public administration. In addition, several 
urgent societal problems have been addressed within a new type of public 
policies which cut across existing policy areas and ministerial portfolios, 
such as environmental protection, gender equality, economic competition 
or anti-corruption (Bogdanor, 2005; Bouckaert, Peters, & Verhoest, 2010). 
Consequently, the problem of coordination immanent to every policy became 
the central administrative and policy problem of the modern societies and the 
governance approach which advocates a broad inclusion of different actors in 
both policy formulation and policy implementation process.
In developing democracies and public administrations the coordination issues 
become even more visible (Matei & Dogaru, 2013; Saner et al., 2008; James 
& Staronova, 2003; Staronova, 2002). The building of adequate coordination 
structures and developing the instruments of coordination has been one of the 
main elements of state and administration reforms, especially in the Central 
and Eastern Europe (hereinafter CEE). The inherited coordination mechanism 
based on the transfer of decision-making from the communist party to the 
state institutions via the political appointees in the political bodies and 
administration (nomenclature) could not respond to the new political, social 
and economic environment in the transition period and processes of opening 
up to the society, democratization, Europeanisation and internationalization. 
In the new political and economic context it became necessary to develop and 
to institutionalize coordination structures and functions which would connect 
government horizontally and vertically and ensure transparent and effective 
decision making and implementation.
This paper examines the problem of coordination in Croatia in three 
distinctive policies which cut across different sectors, enhancing the need for 
coordination at the highest administrative and political levels – the regional 
development policy, the anti-corruption policy, and the e-government policy. 
Special emphasis is put on the evolution of political and administrative 
structures of coordination, the actors included in coordination of policies and 
the impact of the EU on the development and the success of coordination. The 
coordination in Croatian public administration is generally assessed as weak, 
especially at the level of central state administration (Petak, 2009; Petak & 
Petek, 2009). The problem of coordination of policy in both formulation and 
implementation phase might be connected to the shortcomings (or absence) 
of the strategic management in government. The paper will try to address the 
following questions: What kind of coordination structures and instruments 
are used and what problems do specific policies encounter with regard to the 
coordination? The answers are based on the data gathered by the analysis of 
legal documents and interviews with several top civil servants.
The paper is structured as follows. In chapter 2 the issue coordination is 
analysed, first in relation to contemporary governance, then with regard to 
the policy formulation and implementation, and finally as an organisational 
concept. In chapter 3 the problem of coordination in transition countries 
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is presented, with special emphasis on Croatia. The research framework is 
conceptualized and the findings are presented and discussed. In chapter 4 
some conclusions and prospects for further research are drawn.
2 The Review of the Coordination Issue
2.1 The Central Role of Coordination in Modern Societies
The problem of coordination is a well-known but understudied problem in 
public administration literature. The classical administrative thought has 
argued that the trends of specialisation and both horizontal and vertical 
differentiation of administrative activity in modern state cause an increased 
need for coordination as well as integration (see Pusić et al., 1988). By 
specialisation we assume the process of creation of new administrative 
organisations out of traditional monolithic departments which may have 
conflicting goals or objectives (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004; Verhoest, Bouckaert, 
& Peters, 2007). The specialisation can be horizontal, if it emerges at the same 
administrative level, or vertical, when it allocates tasks on different hierarchical 
levels, usually under the terms of decentralisation, devolution or delegation. 
As a consequence of specialisation, Gulick’s motto “influence outcomes” 
by “working together for a common purpose” accentuated the importance 
of coordination regardless of criteria of specialisation – geography, task, 
clientele, process (Meier, 2010; Christensen & Laegreid, 2008). Few decades 
later Thompson (1967) as well as Mintzberg (1979) confirmed one of the key 
hypotheses of organisation theory that specialisation and differentiation put 
pressure on coordination (Verhoest et al., 2007, p. 326) creating organisational 
domains which have to be reconciled in order to achieve common goals.
Still, the importance of coordination in the system of governance has risen 
tremendously in recent decades. The New Public Management (NPM) 
exacerbated the specialisation trend by pleading for the differentiation, 
delegation, devolution and decentralisation to independent agencies, 
outsourcing to private sector organisations, as well as the privatisation of 
public services. The idea that relatively autonomous specialised organisation 
would help achieve effectiveness and efficiency of public sector led to the 
disaggregation and atomisation of public sector, with complex relations 
between ministries and agencies, sometimes based on contractual relationship 
and performance control. Splitting policy and administrative tasks in different 
types of administrative organisations (ministries versus agencies) is one of the 
main NPM goals (Hood, 1991). Parallel to that, the process of decentralisation 
to local units has transferred the responsibility for delivery of services to 
regions and local units. In this sense, P. 6 (2004, p. 107) accentuates that the 
importance of coordination in contemporary governance systems does not 
emerge from mere specialisation, but from fragmentation which exacerbates 
“lack of good conflict management” and “inadequately structured relationship 
between specialties”.
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Another incentive for paying greater attention to coordination is found in the 
emergence of special kind of policy problems, most of which are connected to 
increased customer orientation and focus on service delivery (Verhoest et al., 
2007; Christensen & Laegreid, 2007; P. 6, 2004). First, the cross-cutting issues 
which mark contemporary societies add to already complex web of structures, 
relations and processes. The term relates to the horizontal policies such as 
environmental protection, sustainable growth, minority rights, but also those 
related to specific groups, such as elderly, disabled persons, unemployed, 
etc. (see Peters, 1998, p. 11). Contemporary societies face the whole range 
of ‘wicked problems’ that have to be dealt and solved by joint effort of 
different organisations, layers of government, and sector areas. Weber and 
Khademian (2008) define three characteristics of wicked problems: they are 
unstructured, because they do not exhibit clear cause-effect relationship 
but show complexity which challenges traditional way of solving problems; 
they are crosscutting, because they include different elements which relate 
to different policy areas and actors and cannot be dealt by one department; 
finally, they are relentless, in the meaning that they can hardly be solved, but 
their direct or indirect consequences are felt in concentric circles around main 
problem. Hence, the main goal is to tackle a part of the problem in order to 
decrease its intensity. Examples include drug abuse, security issues, reducing 
crime, homelessness, etc, as “highly complex and intractable social problems” 
(Keast, Mandell, Brown, & Woolcock, 2004).
The coordination issue is especially accentuated with regard to the 
processes of globalisation, Europeanisation and professionalisation, but 
also the recent economic and security crisis (Christensen & Laegreid, 2007). 
Globalisation influences the degree of coordination, since it puts pressure 
on the efficiency of governments to solve social problems, boost economy 
and ensure social development. Joint efforts are needed to achieve advanced 
position in comparison to other competitors, followed by the proliferation of 
specialised international and regional organisations. Similarly, in the EU policy 
making, the issue of coordination emerges as a prerequisite of successful 
membership in terms of EU policies formulation and implementation, as 
well as with regard to the coordination of various policy sectors among the 
levels of European governance. Moreover, professionalisation as a form of 
specialisation in connection to the processes of globalisation and information 
technology revolution enhances creation of professional networks which 
spread well beyond boundaries of state and even profession itself. The new 
forms rest upon a new type of coordinating philosophy, on shared values and 
interests and seeks for creation of new coordinating instruments. Finally, 
the importance of coordination arises in times of economic crisis, but also 
in times of the enhanced stress for the security. The reorganisations and 
rationalisation programmes launched in last few years in many countries, 
had the task to examine and re-set the priorities as well as to simplify the 
structures and procedures which often led to mergers and abolitions of 
previously overlapping structures and multiplied tasks. The fiscal pressure 
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to decrease public spending has political implications – inefficiencies in public 
sector cost more than in private sector, not only wasting public money but 
also leaving citizens deprived of service. In addition, natural catastrophes 
and security threats have put enormous pressures to the development of 
coordinative functions of crisis management in order to enhance prevention 
or to make the problem-solving process more efficient.
As a response to NPM driven fragmentation, which in the above mentioned 
context has reinforced the pillarisation and siloisation of public sector, the 
post-NPM reforms have been increasingly focused on joining-up the pillars 
of administrative activity. In the second half of the 1990s the programs of 
whole-of-government (Christensen & Laegreid, 2007), joining-up (Davies, 
2009; Pollitt, 2003; Bogdanor, 2005) or holistic government (P. 6, 2004) 
have emerged as a solution which should enhance effectiveness of policy 
work and help to solve problems facing modern states. The strengthening 
the coordination capacity has focused not only on hierarchical mechanisms, 
but also on networks and markets, as alternatives to authoritative top-down 
approach (Verhoest et al., 2007), but with path dependent trajectories 
(Beuselinck, Verhoest, & Bouckaert, 2006; Hustedt & Tiessen, 2006). The 
concept of ‘joined-up government’ was defined by Pollitt (2003, p. 35) “as 
phrase which denotes the aspiration to achieve horizontally and vertically co-
ordinated thinking and action” in order to eliminate contradictions between 
policies, achieve better use of resources, improve cooperation, and produce 
integrated services.
When it comes to the joined-up government efforts as well as the 
coordination in the administrative system, different factors are found to be 
relevant. For example, 6 (2004, pp. 110–112) accentuates five variables as 
being of importance for the emergence of joining-up efforts: the importance 
of particular events (such as terrorist attack), the type of political system 
(Rechtstaat or public interest principle, which is more in favour of coordinative 
efforts), national political-administrative cultures (Anglo-Saxon countries 
are seen as being more in favour of joining-up) and path dependency plus 
negative feedback, in the meaning of adopting coordination strategies in 
order to correct the failures of reform. Similarly, Bouckaert et al. (2010) argue 
that explanatory factors can be found in the politico-administrative traditions, 
type of responsibility (minister vs. collegium), position of the horizontal 
departments, the size of a country, and the type of agencification. 
2.2 The Importance of Coordination for Policy Formulation and 
Implementation
The process of developing specific adjective or sector policies involves various 
stages, with different number of the participants at each of the particular 
stage, which makes policy analysis an extremely complex discipline. The 
process of governing policy issues assumes several structural preconditions. 
The most prominent is the idea of instrumentality, indicating that government 
122 International Public Administration Review, Vol. 13, No. 3–4/2015
Anamarija Musa, Zdravko Petak
is obliged to find solutions to social problems. Other assumptions follow from 
this one. The first is coherence, in the sense that “all the bits of the action 
should fit together and form part of an organized whole” (Colebatch, 2009, p. 
10). The second relates to the idea of hierarchy, indicating that governing is 
accomplished by the application of authority. The issue of policy coordination 
stems from the account pointing out the question of coherence, having in mind 
that ‘much policy work is concerned with the way different agencies handle 
the same policy issues’ (Colebatch, 2009, p. 9). From this standpoint of view 
policy coordination can be defined as the efforts aimed to synchronization 
and integration of developing and implementing public policy.2
The problem of policy coordination is particularly pertinent for the formulation 
and implementation of particular policy. The insufficient coordination between 
policy-stakeholders in the process of formulating policy, as well as failure to 
coordinate implementation activities can be labelled as the core problem of 
policy. Coordination in the stage of formulation includes numerous activities 
related to the preparation of policy proposals, the preparation of legal drafts, 
the inter-ministerial consultations, the submissions of these proposals to 
government office, the review of these policy documents by the office, as 
well as the final review by governments’ commissions and the inner cabinet 
(OECD, 2007). The similar can be applied to implementation, having in mind 
that the efficient implementation, from the top-down view, relies on several 
preconditions: clearly defined policy objectives and goals, available resources 
and clearly defined policy instruments and capacity for monitoring and 
coordination of particular policies (Sabatier, 1986).
There are several dimensions of policy coordination which are studied within 
the disciplines of administrative science and policy sciences. These dimensions 
include differences between positive and negative aspects of coordination, 
vertical and horizontal lines of coordination, short-term and long-term 
aspects of achieving coherence of the policy goals, and finally the different 
meaning of the coordination in issues related to the policy and issues related 
to the administration (Peters, 2015, pp. 9–19). For the purpose of our study 
it is particularly interesting to make a clear distinction between political and 
administrative coordination, which directly originates from the previously 
mentioned difference between administration and policy. The bottom-
up approach to coordination indicates “the role administrators can play in 
producing effective coordination”, while pointing out political angle stresses 
the fact that legitimacy and power for running policies “may be vested in 
political leaders rather than in administration” (Peters, 2015, p. 14). One 
can speak of horizontal and vertical policy management. The former relates 
2 Peters distinguishes between four levels of coordination. The first relates to negative 
coordination (involving coping with the situations in which government programs and 
organizations overlapping), followed by the positive coordination (finding ways of 
collaborative actions of government bodies in order to provide better services for the 
clients), policy integration (which includes coordinating the goals being pursued by public 
organizations and not only service delivery) and development a strategies for government, as 
a most complex form of coordination (Peters, 2004, pp. 5–6).
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to coordination among participators from different policy fields at the same 
governmental level, whereas the latter relates to coordination of different 
levels of government. The horizontal guidelines pertain to organisational 
cooperation and help to remove obstacles hindering the efficient interaction 
amongst administrative bodies in particular policy fields, while the vertical 
guidelines pertain to linking the objectives, structures and resources in order 
to establish a relation between strategy and service delivery. The importance 
of vertical policy coordination has been strongly enhanced by the side-effects 
of Europeanisation, which is firmly based on the concept of multi-level 
governance.
Therefore, the activities relating to formulation, as well as to implementation 
of a particular policy require different levels of coordination. Since the 
government mechanism does not stand as a single body, but rather consists 
of organisations which are to a different degree mutually inter-connected, 
the coordination exercise reflects the ideas of efficient interaction between 
various parties in an effort to work together toward a common goal. In doing 
so, policy coordination involves various procedures and structures, such as an 
efficient consultation system and the role of policy expertise in government 
office, the role of cabinet committees in coordinating policies, the 
establishment of central agencies, coordinative efforts across ministries and 
many other forms. Moreover, one can speak of instruments of coordination, 
which can include the organisation of the core executive, the structure of 
chief executive staff, central policy agencies, functioning of cabinet or prime-
minister office and the role of cabinet committees in policy coordination 
(Peters, 2015).
The next question accounts for the measurement and degrees of coordination. 
In the literature Metcalfe’s classification of policy coordination (Metcalfe, 
1994) is widely employed dealing with hierarchically developed phases of 
policy coordination, determining the intensity of coordinative efforts along 
nine dimensions which measure the coordination capacity. The scale relates 
to “a series of steps, which add successive coordination functions in a specific 
logical sequence” (Metcalfe, 1994, p. 281). The lowest level of coordination 
relates to the (1) independent organisational decision making, where each 
organisation retains autonomy within its own policy domain, based on their 
own legal and political prerogatives; on the next level, organisations are 
obliged to (2) communication to other organisations (information exchange), 
to inform others about issues and proposed actions; the quality of channels 
of communication plays a role; on the next level (3), organisations are 
using consultation with other organisations, which includes seeking for and 
giving advice to other organisations in the process of formulating policies; 
next, (4) avoiding divergences among ministries, on the next level, focuses 
on eliminating divergent negotiating positions (a negative coordination); 
(5) inter-organisational search for agreement (seeking consensus), is 
trying to make organisations work together, reaching consensus; joint 
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committees and project teams are used; next step (6) relates to arbitration 
of inter-organisational differences, where the contradictions or conflicts are 
being resolved by a third party; more than this, (7) setting parameters for 
organisations, happens when a central organisation gets more active, by setting 
parameters on the discretion of individual organisations, such as budgetary or 
regulatory constraints; (8) establishing government priorities, relates to the 
active steering by setting clear priorities and coherent framework for lower 
levels; finally, (9) an overall governmental strategy is the case which is rare in 
practice, but would create totally unified system, with decision about choices. 
Positive coordination includes higher levels of coordination, from seven to 
nine, and all actions in earlier stages are still being considered as a negative 
coordination (Metcalfe, 1994, pp. 281–284).
An extremely important line in policy coordination research relates to national 
case-studies, showing the peculiarities of coordinating public policies in 
different national administrative systems. Among this kind of literature a few 
studies should be mentioned, covering several developed democracies – four 
OECD countries: New Zealand, United Kingdom, Sweden, France (Verhoest et 
al., 2007), seven OECD countries: New Zealand, United Kingdom, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, France, Belgium and the United States (Bouckaert et al., 2010). 
Besides this research there is a list of numerous national case-studies with 
in-depth analysis of policy coordination achievements in particular developed 
democracies: Australia (Painter, 1981), Canada (Hopkins, Couture, & Moore, 
2001; Peach, 2004), Finland (Pelkonen, Teräväinen, & Waltari, 2008), etc. For 
the purpose of our paper the findings related to post-communist countries 
should be mentioned, like the review of Romanian case (Matei & Dogaru, 
2013) or the case of several post-communist countries (Saner et al., 2008). The 
proliferation of policy coordination studies deeply oriented to institutional 
arrangements in particular countries could be extremely helpful in refining 
theoretical statements on coordination issues, particularly the effectiveness 
of policy coordination measures.
2.3 An Overview of the Concept of Coordination – Types, 
Mechanisms, Structure, and Instruments
There are different approaches to coordination. The choice of perspective 
depends on the theoretical framework and the aim of the particular research. 
For example, from the point of public sector inter-organisational coordination 
is perceived as “the instruments and mechanisms that aim to enhance the 
voluntary or forced alignment of tasks and efforts of organisations within the 
public sector. These are used in order to create a greater coherence and to 
reduce redundancy, lacunae and contradictions within and between policies, 
implementation or management” (Peters, 1998). From the policy perspective, 
coordination is an “attempt to produce coherent government policies 
and achieve a state that minimizes conflicts that arise between different 
government organisations (mainly ministries) over programs, proposals or 
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legislative bills”, while coherent government policies are political programs 
“free of contradictions both within every single policy and in the whole of 
governmental programs” (Hustedt & Tiessen, 2006, p. 5).
In order to explore the subject more thoroughly, many attempts have been 
made to differentiate between kinds of coordination based on whole range 
of criteria.
• depending on the level and the direction, there are political (or policy) 
and administrative coordination;3 roughly, although it is more of a 
“false dilemma” (Peters, 1998), administrative coordination is bottom-
up approach, implementation bound and oriented towards delivery of 
final result (service), while policy coordination, is top-down approach, 
confined to political level and oriented towards general performance 
of policy or system (see Peters, 1998; 2005; Davies, 1998);4
• depending on the scope, intra-policy coordination, related to one policy 
area formulation and implementation, while inter-policy coordination 
cuts across many policy fields (see Verhoest et al., 2007, p. 330)
• depending on the kind of relationship between responsible 
departments, the negative coordination might relate to passive attitude 
of avoiding conflicts between policy areas, and, if they emerge, solving 
the problem by the department specialised in respective policy; on the 
other side, positive coordination implies active approach based on joint 
efforts to solve identified contradictions or problems, based on mutual 
supporting and cooperating schemes, rules, frames and systems (see 
Peters, 2005; Hustedt & Thiessen, 2006); 
• depending on policies covered, vertical coordination is confined in 
one policy area with many levels (including supranational level), while 
horizontal includes coordinating at the same level across different 
policy areas, with central government and supporting departments 
having significant power to ensure that their centripetal activities have 
a desired effect (Christensen & Laegreid, 2008, p. 102);
• depending to the involvement of actors, coordination may relate to 
different government organisations within own area of work; with 
government organisations in other policy areas; with local and regional 
government; with supra/international organisations; with private sector 
companies or interest organisations and civil society (see Christensen & 
Laegreid, 2008).
3 Hustedt and Thiessen (2006) make distinction between administrative coordination which is 
pursued by civil servants in the beginning stage of coordination process, based on professional 
orientation, expertise, department tradition, individual incentives, and search for policy 
solution); and political coordination, at political level, which is determined by various factors, 
such as party politics, goals, re-election incentives, etc., often including informal instruments; 
somewhere in between is political-administrative coordination.
4 Davis (1998) distinguishes between three types – political coordination, in the meaning of 
the necessity that the government ministers share common objectives and rhetoric; policy 
coordination, in the meaning of setting goals and objectives and preventing contradictions 
between policies; and administrative, the orientation for effectiveness and efficiency in 
accomplishing tasks determined by the government.
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Coordination rests upon two basic mechanisms. Peters (1998) distinguishes 
imposition and bargaining as two sides of coordination, depending whether 
the process is more participative or hierarchical. However, the mechanisms 
follow two strands in neoinstitutionalist thinking, although titles may be 
different (coercion and competition; compliance and competition, etc.). 
Still, contrary to the traditional way of thinking that the government should 
function by imposition and enforce certain behaviour by hierarchical means, 
the modern governments lean on competitive forces or professional 
networks in order to achieve coordination for the sake of public interest. The 
conventional typology includes hierarchy, markets and networks, a distinction 
made by Thompson et al. in 1991, and frequently employed by others (see 
Peters, 1998, 2009, 2015; Verhoest et al., 2007; Hood, James, Peters, & Scott, 
2004):
1. hierarchy is based on authority, imposition and coercion, top-down 
interactions and is supported by political and administrative leadership 
(Peters, 1998, p. 17; Verhoest et al., 2007); it involves setting rules, goals 
and defining tasks together with lines of responsibility and supervision 
(auditing, inspection, political and administrative control); it is directed 
towards resolving conflicting interests and achieve systemic goals, but, 
at the same time, it involves costs that administrators may define as 
unnecessary burden (Peters, 2008);
2. market is based on exchange, price or reward, and competition; markets 
are institutions of coordination (Peters, 2005: 9), creating incentives for 
actors to behave in certain way; they can be created under government 
umbrella (regulated markets), which is one of the effects of NPM 
reforms (internal markets, managerial contracts, PPP), as well as the 
EU (regional policy, structural funds, science and research, etc.);
3. network rests upon shared values, beliefs and norms, as well as the trust 
among the participants; it is usual in professional activities, around same 
policy issues; the network arrangements may evolve spontaneously, 
but they can be created or supported by the authority, by creating 
informational base, or fostering partnership or collaboration; still, this 
type contains a degree of self-regulation (creating standards, peer-
review, etc.).
The adequacy of each mechanism depends on type of policy, phases of 
policy, or kind of actors involved. For example, networks are more suitable 
for formulating policies on the bases of shared objective, while hierarchical 
coordination will be better in relatively closed system, which does not need 
the inclusion of external actors.
Some authors add a fourth type or use different symbols to differentiate 
between mechanisms based on authority or sanctions, price or rewards and 
trust and shared objectives. Peters (2005) differentiates between market, 
networks, collaboration and hierarchy; Hood (2005) differentiates between 
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authority, architecture, mutual interaction and market and price systems; 
Hood et al. (2004) make distinction between oversight, competition, mutuality 
and, as a fourth type, contrived randomness which involves unsystematic, 
non-predicted processes of cooperation, without clear strategy, and expects 
unilateral responses to the coordinated action. Similarly, P. 6 (2004, p. 
116) defines four mechanisms of coordination, depending of the type of 
constraint (strong or weak) and the type of bond (strong or weak): hierarchy, 
individualism, mutuality and subaltern isolates (randomness). 
In sum, types of coordination involve different organisational/structural and 
functional/procedural instruments which are more suitable to certain type of 
mechanism, but can be employed by others too (see Peters, 1998; Verhoest 
et al., 2007; Bouckaert et al., 2010; Christensen & Laegreid, 2008). Structural/
organisational means are aimed to enhance coordination and to close it 
within organisational boundaries or to use the organisation as a centre of 
coordinating activity. Examples include centres of government, secretaries, 
committees, working groups, etc.5 On the other hand, functional instruments 
or processes seek to create or achieve coherent behaviour, policies, etc. They 
range from rules and standard-setting, budgetary or civil service constraints, 
strategies and information sharing.
3 The Exploration of Coordination Structures and Practices 
in Croatia
3.1 Croatian Coordination Issues – A Fine Example of the Problems 
of Coordination in a Transition Country
Coordination as administrative function and policy work in transition countries 
(CEEs and other) has been often addressed in policy documents of international 
organisations (see OECD 2004, 2007, 2008). The comparative studies are 
rare, and focus mostly on core executives (e.g. Dimitrov, Goetz, & Wollmann, 
2006), or, if dealing with structures, are concerned based on comparative 
or single case research of specific policy coordination. Scientific research 
on coordination is mostly confined in single case studies or two or three 
countries comparisons of EU accession coordination structures and EU policy 
coordination, often from the point of the Europeanisation literature (Fink-
Hafner, 2007; Gärtner, Hörner, & Obholzer, 2011; Zubek & Staronova, 2012). 
5 As horizontal coordination structures Peters (1998) enumerates at the core government level 
following structural instruments – chief executive staff, central agencies, cabinet, cabinet 
committees, ministers without portfolio or with additional coordinative portfolio and junior 
ministers; at the ministerial level – super ministries, advisory bodies, boards; agencies with 
portfolios relevant to coordination; interministerial organizations; task forces, working 
groups and others; interdepartmental committees, coordinating organizations; coordination 
at the bottom; and informal organizations, such as political party, interest groups and civil 
service network.
Temmes (2006) leans on Mintzberg’s differentiation and conceptualises the structures of 
coordination as containing strategic apex, which is supporting prime minister as a main tool 
of governance; techno structure, involved in strategic planning, budget frames, controlling, 
personnel policies and training, organisational development, etc.); and administrative support 
as administrative machinery responsible for legal and budget control.
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As an explanatory variable for different adaptations the role of administrative 
tradition is emphasised, as well as changes in government (Fink-Hafner, 2007). 
Staronova (2002) argues that the focus should shift from the content of the 
policies to the way policies are made – their formulation, implementation and 
evaluation (see also Petak, 2008).
For example, Saner et al. (2008) focus on inter-ministerial policy coordination 
in government cabinets and its critical role in governance, emphasising the 
pressure put on developing institutions in CEEs for simultaneously managing 
complex change and multiple problems. “The large number of tasks ranging in 
character from simple to complex requires the establishment of sophisticated 
organisational structures that are able to combine various governmental 
entities, such as ministries, departments, agencies, commissions, etc. To 
effectively cope with the activities of all these administrative bodies, ECE/
SEE governments had to develop sound and constructive coordination 
mechanisms that were expected to result in an effective and efficient decision-
making process” (ibid., p. 222). The role of EU accession is accentuated as 
one of the main drivers for administrative change, including coordination 
structures and processes (ibid.). However, CEEs are facing problems when it 
comes to effective coordination, because the immanent problems of their 
administrative and political elites – lack of managerial skills, lack of expertise 
in leading agencies, lack of civil service ethics and values, politicisation of civil 
eservice, as well as underdeveloped coordinating structures and inadequate 
transfer of international models (Temmes, 2006). Part of the explanation 
might be found in the inherited coordination traditions from previous regime.
Similar conclusions are made in 2004 OECD Sigma paper no. 43 which, in 
aftermath of Eastern enlargement, deals with CEEs and Western Balkan 
countries’ government offices as “administrative organ that serves the 
head of the government (usually the Prime minister) and the Government/
Council of minister” under different names (secretariat, chancellery, cabinet 
office, prime minister’s office (OECD, 2004). The study argues that there 
is a convergence trend in the meaning that CEEs government offices are 
becoming more similar to the OECD countries’ offices in functional terms, but 
that, at the same time, performance of certain functions in policy spectrum, 
especially strategic planning and policy-coordination, is still underdeveloped. 
One of the explanations might be found in the lack of experienced staff 
which should provide policy advice and support to the political apex of the 
government. A good indicator that insufficient skills and knowledge decrease 
the quality of Government offices in CEEs is that “in majority of cases, the 
Secretary-General (even if he/she is a civil servant) is subject to replacement 
when Prime Minister changes” (ibid., p. 7).
When it comes to Croatia, a systematic research on coordination in the past 
two decades is almost non-existent. Except few articles dealing with the policy 
coordination as well as policy documents on EU accession coordination, there 
is no scientific or other type of data or analysis which would point out main 
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characteristics and problems of coordination. The research devoted to policy-
coordination within the Croatian institutional context (James & Staronova, 
2003; Petak & Petek, 2009; Petak, 2015) showed that generally serious 
limitations do exist in all phases of policy-making process. The ineffective 
coordination between participants, the role of applying policy analysis tools 
in the process of formulating a particular policy, and limited capacities for 
monitoring policy in the phase of implementation may be highlighted as core 
weaknesses.
Croatian policy coordination system generally suffers from several 
institutional and structural shortcomings. The prime minister’s office lacks a 
central policy development unit able to evaluate and coordinate the activities 
of the line ministries. Therefore, the policy expertise of prime minister’s 
office, in terms of policy knowledge of particular policy fields, is strongly 
limited. Also, gate-keeping role of the cabinet is mostly formal and not based 
on policy argumentation, or in other words, backed by applicative policy 
analysis capacity (Petak, 2015). Line ministries consult with the government’s 
legislation office, but this consultation is mostly formal, focusing on technical 
and drafting issues. Ministries normally enjoy huge leeway in transforming 
government priorities into legislation, and there is no stable and transparent 
arbitration scheme that would give the prime minister’s office a formal role 
in resolving inter-ministerial differences. There is a little ex ante coordination 
among ministries, controversies are often pushed upwards, so that cabinet 
committees play an important role in reconciling conflicts within the cabinet. 
And finally, direct coordination of policy proposals by ministries is extremely 
limited. There is no stable and transparent scheme of settling inter-ministerial 
differences within the bureaucracy (James & Staronova, 2003). Deadlines for 
comments by other ministries are often too short, capacities for comments 
are sometimes inadequate and comments made by other ministries are often 
not taken seriously.
Applying the above mentioned policy coordination scale (Metcalfe, 1994; 
Bouckaert et al., 2010) on the Croatian example, the achievement of higher 
levels might seem especially problematic, especially levels from six to nine 
(arbitration, setting parameters, prioritizing, and strategy), which might 
be related to the inexperience in strategic management. However, the 
problems do exist also at the lower levels of coordination – in the classical 
issues of horizontal policy management linked with the consolidation of inter-
organisational activities. Despite the modest attempt of the Government in 
2010 to eliminate the number of agencies (approximately from 78 to 63) 
by mergers and abolishment of overlapping functions, the concepts like 
“joined-up government” (Pollitt, 2003) still do not have substantial impact 
on the course of reform of the state administration in Croatia or the modes 
of governance in general. Hence, no clear position has yet been taken on 
how to determine the criteria required for the implementation of a high-
quality horizontal public policy management – the assessment of the extent 
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of overlapping functions, or of the degree of incoherence and of the level 
of gaps in the policy. A thorough application of policy analysis by adequate 
expert knowledge is missing. The problem, among others, lies in the supply of 
policy-related knowledge, in the insufficient number of experts able to carry 
out policy analysis efficiently.
Another problem is vertical coordination – a reliable institutional mechanism 
for vertical (as well as horizontal, for that matter) public policy in Croatia is 
missing, something like the prime minister’s or the government’s central 
policy office (Petak, 2008). The overview of institutional practices of vertical 
policy coordination in developed democracies (ibid.) shows that such a body 
closely cooperates with the state treasury and all other agencies of central 
government. Since there is no central government’s policy agency in Croatia, 
the overall authority for carrying out such assessments lies expressly in the 
hands of the Minister of Finance, who takes part in the work of all coordination 
bodies and makes decisions on all disputable issues, becoming a kind of a 
“policy switchman” who acts as a substitute for a central government’s policy 
agency. The problem is in the fact that, this way, decisions are made on the 
basis of a rough (financial) estimate and not on the basis of a systematic policy 
analysis.
3.2 The Research Framework
The research presented in this paper is focused on the description of the 
coordination in three distinctive policies in Croatia – the regional development 
policy, the anti-corruption policy, and the e-government policy. All three 
policies are new policies which have emerged after 2000 and are to a different 
degree related to the EU accession. Moreover, all three policies exert features 
of cross-cutting policies, relating to different sectors. On the other hand, three 
policies differ in many aspects, such as salience of the policy, type of policy, 
actors’ involvement, mechanisms used for coordination, as well as the role 
of the EU in the policy development. It has to be noted that The Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement with the EU was signed in 2001, and the accession 
negotiations began in 2005. After 2009–2010 crisis, the negotiations ended 
in 2010, the accession agreement was signed in December 2011 and Croatia 
became the full EU member on 1 July 2013.
On the basis of the analysis of legal and policy documents as well as the 
semi-structured interviews with seven public officials, the research focuses 
on following elements: (1) the key points in the development of the policy 
(events, actors); (2) the impact of the EU on the policy introduction and 
formulation and the kind of Europeanisation mechanism used as a main 
driver of the policy development; (3) the role of international coordination 
and organisations; (4) who are the main actors involved in the policy 
formulation and implementation; who are other actors; (5) what kind of 
coordinating structures emerged and under which circumstances (political 
and administrative coordination) and who is being coordinated; (6) which 
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factors have led to the more elaborated coordination structure. The analysis 
is focused on the period before the EU membership.
3.3 The Research Findings – Coordination of Three Policies
3.3.1 The Regional Development Policy
Until early 2000, Croatia’s regional development policy did not even exist as 
a coherent policy framework, since the collapse of socialism and Yugoslavia 
had resulted in a sort of vacuum6, without any ideas what should be the 
instruments, objectives and goals of the regional development policy (Petak, 
2006). What actually did exist in the 1990s was the patchwork of several 
central governments’ activities in the areas of special state concern (related 
to the heaviest damaged areas in the war 1991–1995), mountain and remote 
areas and islands (Sumpor & Starc, 2003). This phase has been described in 
the literature as the “humanitarian aid stage” (Đulabić & Manojlović, 2011). 
The CARDS program in early 2000s was the beginning of the pre-accession 
process in Croatia, but more recognized regional policy development can be 
traced from 2005 onwards within the IPA program.7
During that period, the regional development policy was continued to be 
fragmented despite the pressures caused by the EU accession process. The 
regional policy was still made in a number of ministries (those connected with 
the economy in general and ministries of regional development, forestry, 
agriculture, sea, transport, and infrastructure). Moreover, two agency type 
organisations for regional development were established in 2001 – The 
Regional Development Fund and The Development and Employment Fund. 
Legal regulations were equally fragmented since they were applicable to the 
separate areas of regional development implemented by various sectoral 
bodies. The missing point was a coherent regulatory framework, which 
would frame the ways for formulating, implementing and evaluating regional 
development policy.
A few years after the first discussions on regional development policy had 
been held, a strategic framework for the 2006–2013 was introduced. It was 
supposed to become some sort of a template for drafting of all development 
strategies, including the regional ones. While the document failed to 
clearly identify the strategic priorities of regional development and was 
markedly inconsistent and very broad, it was the first time that the term 
“regional development” was mentioned at all (in the chapter “Space, Nature, 
6 Here we should particularly underline the abandoning of the concept of running regional 
development policy which existed within the socialist system since 1990. The system was 
created in the final decades of the socialist era and was based on horizontal linking of some 
one hundred of Croatian municipalities into so-called ‘regional associations of municipalities’ 
(Petak, 2006).
7 CARDS Programme (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and 
Stabilisation) was the EU’s main instrument of financial assistance to the Western Balkans, 
in period 2000–2006. It was replaced by the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) 
programme 2007–2013.
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Environment and Regional Development”). However, the change that took 
place in that period concerned the structured interaction of the horizontal 
policy actors. With a help from the authorities on the county level, county 
development agencies gradually started to emerge. They started applying 
the EU policy narrative used for regional policy, focusing their activities to 
preparation of specific development strategies on their respective territories. 
Numerous actors / stakeholders from the economic and civil sector joined the 
game on the regional level, thus contributing to a gradual shaping up of an 
institutional context for the regional policy in those years.
A relatively solid regulatory framework for the regional development policy 
was put in place only in 2009, when the Regional Development Law was 
adopted, followed by the Regional Development Strategy in 2010. By this 
token, the institutional core of the Croatian regional development policy 
was established. The key policy actors in formulating regional development 
policy in this context included various departments, with a prominent role 
for Ministry for regional development, but also numerous foreign experts for 
regional development policy-making, regional/county authorities and regional 
developmental agencies, as well as, to a certain degree, the researchers from 
the field of regional development (scholars from the field of economics, social 
policy, administrative science and public finances). Thanks to the principle of 
partnership, introduced by the EU regional policy principles, many horizontal 
policy stakeholders, from the business as well as civil society have been also 
introduced into the process of developing regional development policy.8
What were the basic outcomes of the above mentioned institutional and 
policy actors’ framework? Is regional development policy in Croatia going to 
become a more coherent and less fragmented policy?
Lack of knowledge by local and regional policy actors related to strategic 
development goals at the regional level still continued to exist. In other 
words, the real knowledge of local and county policy stakeholders to discover 
the ways by which it will be possible to recognize the basic goals, objectives 
and policy measures which might be beneficial for stimulating regional 
development left a more or less unrecognized issue. In spite of all efforts 
devoted to establishing various forms of partnership and partnership forums 
(partnership at the county level, partnership at the NUTS II level) dissemination 
of information on how to connect basic policy instruments with particular 
policy goals and objectives appeared as the basic problem in formulating 
regional development policy in a specific Croatian case.9
8 Policy implementation bodies include Ministry of Regional Development, Agency for Regional 
Development (established in 2008 with the role of administering regional development funds), 
partners’ council of a statistical region and participation in its work (state administration 
bodies, regional and local self-government units, private sector, scientific community, social 
partners and civil society organizations from the territory of the statistical region), regional 
authority bodies.
9 This kind of remark is sharing much in common with the general findings of Croatian policy 
scholars related to shortcomings in using ex-ante evaluation techniques in formulating public 
policy in Croatia (see Petak & Petek, 2009).
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This kind of observation opens the first issue related to the question of policy 
coordination in a specific regional development adjective policy. County 
development agencies (CDA)10 showed as crucial institutional entities for 
coordinating policy actors at the regional level, but as the entities with limited 
success in developing reliable policy coordination required for the effective 
implementation of local development programs. In interviews made with 
regional development policy experts in Croatia it has been found that in their 
judgment a low level disputes in Metcalfe (1994) taxonomy on coordination 
appeared as a basic problem. Information exchange with other organisations 
(level 2) and information feedbacks related to limited consultations with 
other organisations (level 3) appeared to be a basic failure in the behaviour 
of CDAs. The lack of policy capacities of Croatian CDAs is therefore the first 
coordination failure issue related to regional development policy.
The other form of policy disputes related to coordination is related to the 
shortcomings that exist at the departmental level. Namely, there are four 
basic actors at the ministerial level responsible for implementing IPA III 
component – Regional development, with three subcategories – transport, 
environment and regional competiveness. Ministry of Regional Development 
is responsible for conducting the basic stream of regional development policy, 
with a special governmental institutions designed in order to formulate and 
implement such a policy.11 Aside from the fact that coordinative mechanisms 
of regional development policy are located at the Directorate for Regional 
Development of the Ministry of Regional Development, real jurisdiction over 
basic components of IPA III is actually allocated to the other three departments 
– Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, Ministry of Environment and 
Ministry of Economy. Croatian scholars in regional policy studies marked 
previously mentioned overlapping as the basic institutional shortcomings in 
regional development policy-making, pointing out that it is “quite illogical to 
have four different managing authorities in charge of almost the same task 
of managing European funds related to regional development” (Đulabić & 
Manojlović, 2011, p. 1054).
Interviews with senior civil servants working in the Ministry of Regional 
Development showed the inexistence of policy templates for avoiding 
divergences among ministerial departments, as well as agreements how to 
conduct joint goals and particularly how to arbitrate in the cases of severe 
10 In Croatia 20 developmental agencies were established at the county (županije) level. The only 
county without its own regional development agency is the City of Zagreb (Zagreb has a dual 
municipal-county administrative status). The agencies are tremendously different with regard 
to their administrative and policy capacities, or in other words, the capacity to produce reliable 
regional projects being able to boost development at the regional level and the capacity to 
communicate and coordinate actors which indispensable for formulating and implementing 
regional development policy.
11 Within Ministry a Directorate for Regional Development is established, with a particular 
Sub-Directorate for Regional Development Policy (the other sub-directorates are related 
to islands, implementation of developmental programs etc.). The above mentioned sub-
directorate is divided into division for Regional Development Policy and Coordination and 
division for Monitoring and Reporting.
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policy differences (levels 4–6 in Metcalf’s taxonomy). This kind of policy 
disputes can be marked as the second failure in effective policy coordination 
of regional development policy.
Nevertheless, the current processes of Europeanisation of regional 
development policy in Croatia showed itself as a more coherent step in 
comparison to absolutely fragmented policy in that field which did exist 
before 2000. Vertical and horizontal policy actors (Colebatch, 2004) started 
to apply the EU policy narratives connected with regional policy, focusing 
their activities to preparation of specific development strategies on their 
respective territories. Numerous stakeholders from the business and civil 
sectors respectively joined developmental policy game on the regional level, 
thus contributing to gradual shaping up of an institutional context for the 
regional policy in Croatia in years following 2000.
Almost the entire new framework of the regional development policy 
came into being as a result of direct pressures from the EU (Bache et al., 
2011). The regional development policy was used to harmonize local and 
regional development needs with the priorities of the central government, 
ensure support to less developed areas and provide even and sustainable 
development of local and regional self-government units in border areas. The 
entire institutional framework, defined by the Regional Development Law 
– regional development policy, development index, regional development 
policy planning documents (Croatia’s Regional Development Strategy, county 
development strategies), supported areas, development program plan, 
statistical region, government programs strategy – is strongly defined by the 
narrative of the EU Cohesion Policy. The same can be said for the fundamental 
principles on which the policy was to be based: solidarity, equal opportunities, 
partnership and cooperation, strategic planning, pooling of resources, 
monitoring and evaluation (a central electronic database of development 
projects was established), sustainability, local autonomy. Since the EU had 
also invested considerable funds into the post-war reconstruction of Croatia, 
it started indicating that drawing of the resources from the pre-accession 
funds would not be possible without appropriate paperwork coverage.12 
That gave a direct boost to the creation of regulative frameworks necessary 
for running coherent regional policy – Regional Development Law, Regional 
Development Strategy, county regional development strategies.
3.3.2 The Anti-Corruption Policy
The anti-corruption policy (AC policy) is an example of a cross-cutting state 
administration policy with far reaching political, societal and economic 
effects. In recent decades the corruption has been recognized as one of the 
main obstacles for exercise of citizens’ rights and the functioning of the state, 
12 In accordance with pre-accession activities and for the administrative purposes of EU funds, 
Croatia has been divided into three NUTS-2 regions: Northwestern Croatia (six counties), 
Eastern Croatia (eight counties) and Adriatic Croatia (seven counties).
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but also as the problem which undermines both public trust and the economic 
investments and development (Erakovich, Kavran, & Wyman, 2006, p. 1238). 
Corruption relates to the abuse of public authority, most often based on 
an illicit exchange between a public official and another person, in order to 
achieve private gain (for typology see Pedersen & Johansen, 2006; Matei & 
Matei, 2010; The World Bank, 2000). The fact is that the corruption is often 
left undiscovered, it is important to observe not only reported and sanctioned 
forms of corruption, but also the perception of corruption in the society.13
Starting from the fact that the corruption undermines democracy and 
human rights, as well as the economic development and the functioning of 
the market, the AC policies have been designed and supported especially by 
the international organisations. Several important international agreements 
and documents, such as those of the United Nations, the Council of Europe, 
especially its anti-corruption body – GRECO, the World Bank, the OECD, as well 
as the EU, have been adopted during 1990s, the decade of the fight against 
corruption, and the efforts have continued in the 2000s (see Grubiša, 2010).14 
In addition, the anti-corruption programmes and activities were advocated 
by international civil society organisations and think tanks (e.g. Transparency 
International, etc.).
After the break-up of socialist regimes in CEEs, the corruption problem became 
immediately evident and continued to endure during the transition phase in 
the 1990s and later. Within the reform assistance projects, the OECD, the EU 
and other actors have promoted the two step approach towards the problem 
of corruption in CEEs: during 1990s, the activities were directed towards the 
awareness rising, mostly by cooperation of international organisation with 
the domestic NGOs, and in the 2000s towards capacity building, especially 
with regard to the inclusion of state and local authorities (Bryane, 2007; 
Erakovich et al., 2006). The anti-corruption efforts are integral part of the EU 
enlargement policy and the EU neighbourhood policy (see Börzel & Pamuk; 
Matei & Matei, 2011). The OECD (2008) differs between institutions engaged 
in prevention and combating corruption, to whom different anticorruption 
functions are assigned: policy development, research, monitoring and 
13 The benchmarking of the countries with regard to the perception of the corruption has 
become a widespread means to assess the prevalence of the corruption and the quality of 
government, as it is done by the Corruption Perception Index of the Transparency International 
or the World Bank’s Control of Corruption index. According to the 2011Corruption Perception 
Index, Croatia’s score was 4.0, the same as in Montenegro and Slovakia, which put them 
66th out of 182 countries, better than Italy (3.9), Greece (3.4), or Bulgaria (3.3.). But, when 
‘perception’ is measured, there might be a tendency to score higher in perception at the very 
beginning of the fight corruption activities, when this issue is interesting for the media and 
politically important, as stated by one of the interviewers.
14 Examples include the UN Convention against Corruption (2003, also signed by the EU), the 
GRECO’s (Group of States against Corruption, including 48 European states and the USA) 
Twenty Guiding Principles for the Fight Against Corruption (1997), the OECD’s Convention 
on the Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
(1997) and later recommendations (2009), the EU’s Convention on the fight against 
corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of 
the European Union (1997) or European Commission’s Communication on a comprehensive 
EU policy against corruption (2003).
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co-ordination, prevention of corruption in power structures (ethics, access 
to information, conflict of interest, etc.), education and awareness raising, 
investigation and prosecution (sanctioning of corruptive behaviour). As one 
of the main instruments of prevention of corruption, the establishment of 
independent anti-corruption agencies has been advised by many international 
organisations, with the main purpose to ensure implementation and 
coordination of the policy and to disseminate information and knowledge 
(see Pedersen & Johannsen, 2006). The OECD study (2008) distinguishes 
between three types of anticorruption agencies – (1) multi-purpose agencies, 
(2) law enforcement type institutions and (3) preventive, policy development 
and co-ordination institutions. One international study has shown that for 
the ensuring the effective coordination of the AC policy, the setting up of 
a special body or unit with clear authority, resources, capacity and political 
support is necessary (see Chêne, 2009).
Similar to other CEE countries, the emergence of the AC policy in Croatia 
is related to the EU accession – it was introduced after the signing of 2001 
Stabilization and Association Agreement, and developed further in the course 
of negotiations process from 2006 onwards, when anti-corruption measures 
were defined as a part of the EU acquis (in chapter 23 Justice and human rights 
and also assessed within the general democracy and the rule of law). The 
political weight of the AC policy has proven to be one of the most important 
for the finalization of the accession process. The main goal was to develop 
effective institutional mechanisms for combating corruption, in other words, 
specific policy instruments, as well as effective coordination mechanisms 
and organisational resources. However, the AC policy has undergone three 
different phases, marked by different structural and functional elements.
The first National Programme for Fighting Corruption with the Action Plan 
for Fighting Corruption were adopted by the Croatian Parliament in March 
2002, but the content of the document and the institutional back-up for the 
implementation did not indicate the existence of the determination and the 
political will to fight corruption. The recommendation for the establishment 
of the National commission for the implementation of the Programme was 
not put into effect, and one of the reasons was that the parliamentarians were 
not sure how to define the composition of the Commission. To illustrate, one 
MP said “I think we are not mature enough to give the presidential seat of 
the Commission to the opposition politician”. The administrative coordination 
was trusted to a newly established body (2001) – the Office for the fighting 
corruption and organized crime of the Ministry of the interior, but which did 
not posess real coordinative powers towards other bodies and organisations 
entrusted with different measures. In sum, National programme was not 
“a systematic effort to develop a national policy” and the “political will...
was insufficient for its realisation” (Kregar, 2010, p. 7). Consequently, the 
programme was not implemented.
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The period 2006–2008 marked a new phase in the AC policy development 
in which institutional framework started to emerge, due to the international 
and the EU pressures – the international documents were ratified by 
the Parliament and the EU was stricter on the topic of anti-corruption. 
Consequently, the new strategic document – the National Programme 
for Fighting Corruption 2006–2008 was adopted in April 2006, and the 
monitoring body of the Croatian Parliament was established in October 2006 
– National Council for the monitoring of the implementation of the National 
Programme for Fighting Corruption. The Council was comprised of five MPs 
and six representatives of various stakeholders – employers, trade unions, 
civil society, academia, experts and the media, elected on the basis of the 
public call.15 This Program was slightly improved version of the 2002 Program, 
and in this respect might be considered as a small step forward with regard 
the anti-corruption efforts, but it also suffered from many shortcomings – the 
action plan for the implementation was confusing goals and measures, no 
clear indicators were defined, and no effective coordinating mechanism was 
envisaged, except the coordinating role of the minister of justice (a national 
coordinator for the anti-corruption) who was supposed to support and help 
state administration and other bodies to develop their action plans for 
anticorruption. The Report of the National Council for the period 2006–2007 
expressed the concern about the feasibility of the implementation especially 
with regard to the capacity of the Council to monitor the implementation, 
taking into account weak support service which was not capable to analyse 
the data and reports submitted by various bodies.
The third phase of the AC policy development lasted from 2008 to 2010 when a 
significant step forward in the AC strategy development and institution building 
was made. In July 2008 the Anti-Corruption Strategy, accompanied by the 
Acton Plan was adopted, with specification of measures, deadlines, resources 
and responsible institutions. The objective was to design an appropriate 
institutional framework which would make the combating corruption more 
effective, based on the fact that the previous programmes lacked effective 
coordination and cooperation among institutions implementing the policy 
as well as their efficient supervision. The Action plan referred to various 
action areas and measures, as well as different organisations included in 
implementation (state administration, agencies and other legal persons, 
public enterprises, and local and regional government to a lesser extent). 
The biggest step was made towards more elaborated institutional set-up – 
the institutional structure included the monitoring body, the coordinating 
body, and operative level bodies. First, the supervisory and monitoring body 
of the Croatian Parliament was the National Council for Monitoring the 
Anti-corruption strategy implementation, supported by the Parliamentary 
service, to which the different implementation bodies report. The tasks 
15 The president of the Council was the head of the minor parliamentary opposition party (not 
the main opposition party social-democrats), but had the experience in combating organized 
crime, as a former police officer.
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of the Council included supervision and monitoring of the implementation 
of the AC Strategy, systematic evaluation of data on corruption practices 
delivered by implementing bodies, analysis of the reports of implementing 
bodies, and evaluation of instruments and results; it also proposes measures 
to increase effectiveness of the implementation of the AC strategy, promotes 
and directs cooperation between the Parliament, government bodies and 
other bodies included in the implementation, and submits semi-annual 
reports to the parliament.
Secondly, the main coordinating body at the executive level the Government 
was the Commission for the Monitoring of Implementation of the 
Anticorruption Measures (April 2008), with the task to inter-ministerial 
cooperation and coordination. The Commission’s role was to assess the 
corruption risks and to propose and define measures for their prevention, 
to coordinate the implementation of the Strategy and the Action plan, to 
improve the effectiveness of the AC measures, and to promote cooperation. 
At the beginning, the Commission’s 20 members included the minister of 
justice as the national coordinator and state secretaries of eleven ministries 
plus representative of the bodies entrusted with the implementation of the 
specific activities. The Commission was firstly envisaged as the executive level 
coordinative body, but its composition changed in 2009 when the new prime 
minister took over the leading role in the Commission, lowered the number of 
members to 14, and instead of the state secretaries nominated the ministers 
as the members of the Committee and the head of the State Commission 
for Public Procurement Control. This evolution towards political coordination 
body indicates the higher level of the political salience of the AC policy, 
but also might point out towards greater political will to address problem 
of corruption. Still, in practice, the new composition did not lead to more 
effective coordination because, as one of the interviewers said, the prime 
minister did not invest enough energy and time in the Commission tasks.16
The support to the Commission and administrative coordination was delegated 
to the special organisational unit of the Ministry of Justice to serve as the 
Commission’s Secretariat – first as a as an Anti-Corruption Department within 
the Ministry of Justice Strategic Development Directorate, later as the Anti-
Corruption Sector of the Ministry of Justice. The AC Sector’s role was to propose 
the strategy development and specific anti-corruption measures, to ensure 
cooperation and coordination among implementing bodies, to collect data 
and conduct analysis, and to organise educational and promotional activities, 
including the management of the network of coordinators in implementing 
bodies. At the operational level, the implementation was entrusted to various 
16 The effects of the policy were hardly to be seen by the public and the criticism came also 
from the European Commission. Although in contrast to service delivery policies the anti-
corruption policy outcomes were not clearly measurable, still, most of the indicators of the 
corruption showed that the level was not dropping and the institutions were not sanctioning 
the cases. It was not until 2010 when the policy has started to realize some effects, having 
managed to prosecute former prime minister, several ministers and agency heads. In addition, 
one of the ministers involved in AC policy has been charged of serious corruption scandal.
139Mednarodna revija za javno upravo, letnik 13, št. 3–4/2015
Coordination for Policy in Transition Countries: Case of Croatia
bodies, such as specialised AC units of the police and public prosecution and 
judiciary, horizontal ministries (finance, administration, etc.) and independent 
bodies in charge for supervising implementation of the access to information, 
conflict of interest, audits and public procurement legislation. 
The next phase in the AC policy development (2010–2012) started at the 
end of 2009 when the composition of the Commission has changed, as 
described above. In 2010 the AC policy was revised and the new Action 
plan was drafted, including a special anti-corruption programme for state 
owned companies. Although the revision of the policy was supposed to be 
conducted annually, this was the first time it was reviewed in practice in order 
to exclude inconsistencies and to introduce some new measures. One of the 
reasons for the new approach was the change in prime ministerial position 
in July 2009 and the greater political salience of the corruption issue due 
to the numerous corruption scandals and prosecutions of highly ranked 
politicians. On the other hand, the public enterprises were detected as main 
polygons of corruptive practices, standing outside of effective legal and 
political control. In addition, two politically driven considerations affected the 
change. First, the Commission’s Accession Reports stated that the AC policy 
had to be implemented more effectively in order to fulfil the obligations of 
the EU accession, and this condition became condition sine qua non of the 
membership. The revision of the Action plan had to take into account the 
Report of the Commission and GRECO recommendation. Also, the National 
Council, under the leadership of very enthusiastic opposition politician from 
March 2008 to end 2011, was eager to steer more effectively and to monitor 
the AC strategy implementation, addressing specific issues of the policy and 
opening to the public some of the important corruption cases. As compared 
to the previous Action Plan, the Revised Action Plan contains a somewhat 
limited number of measures, but provides for better-defined implementing 
agencies, action points, objectives and time-frames, although it still lacks 
clear performance indicators for the implementation of measures.
In sum, what lessons might be drawn from the development of the AC policy 
in Croatia? First, political importance of the issue gives the policy higher 
priority and seeks for stronger coordination in order to implement the desired 
measures. As discussed previously, the political salience of the issue combined 
with the political pressures from the EU gave impetus to the more complex 
approach to policy and development of coordination structure which should 
ensure implementation. In addition, political actors (political entrepreneurs) 
seeking to advance their political position might influence the working of 
the existing coordination structures – the new prime minister changed the 
composition of the Commission (end 2009) and gave it more political weight, 
while the new president of the Council (2008–2011) significantly improved its 
working and its monitoring role, constantly putting the issues on the agenda 
of both Parliament and the general public. As one of the interviewers said, 
the first Commission was ineffective in the meaning that the representatives 
140 International Public Administration Review, Vol. 13, No. 3–4/2015
Anamarija Musa, Zdravko Petak
of the implementing bodies were lower level officials who had no real power 
to decide or to enforce decisions and the leading role of the minister of 
justice only confirmed to others that the AC policy is the policy of ministry of 
justice, and not the cross-cutting policy. Having in mind that the upholding 
the policy monitoring and coordination to higher political levels gave the 
policy implementation new speed and steering, the idea of abolishing the 
Commission seems to be leading the policy into a wrong direction.17
Secondly, the crucial factor of the effectiveness of the AC policy formulation 
and implementation is political backing and the capacity of administrative 
coordination mechanism (AC agency), especially in terms of the resources and 
authority to impose measures, as shown by some studies (e.g. OECD, 2008). The 
department within the ministry of justice, despite all its efforts, does not have 
any of these prerequisites. In many of organisational shifts it has encountered 
during these times, the department had insufficient resources, what has 
been underlined in the European Commission reports, but, what seems more 
important, it failed to build an image of the independent specialized body 
which could have resources and authority to coordinate and cooperate with 
overall public administration and public sector bodies, not even at the level of 
negative coordination (information gathering and the accessibility of other 
institutions). This fact, together with low political support, proved to be 
decisive for the implementation of the policy. Moreover, the administrative 
coordination gives the policy necessary continuity and the know-how and 
works as a counterpart of the political changes on the top, which have had a 
strong effect on the AC policy in Croatia, as interviewees noticed.
Finally, the effect of the EU accession as in many policy areas in CEEs, shown 
also in previous section, has proven to be decisive for the development of 
policy. The carrots and sticks approach which forces candidate countries to 
adopt legislation and establish institutions for the anticorruption policy might 
be regarded as one of the most important drivers, in addition to domestic 
political circumstances (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). In this case, the 
problem of asymmetry of power might be considered as positive, since in the 
absence of the EU pressure the AC policy might develop even slower than it 
has so far.
In sum, the overall coordination of AC policy in Croatia has gradually improved 
since first steps have been made in 2002, and some more significant efforts 
in 2006–2008 and 2008–2012 period. The process shows that coordinating 
structures have evolved in both political and administrative part, especially 
after the political upgrading of the governmental coordination committee 
17 In 2012, upon expiration of the 2008-2012 Strategy, the AC policy faced obstruction. New 
Commission members have not been appointed almost a year after new Parliament had been 
established, and one interviewer said that ‘the government is considering abolishing the 
Commission since it does not see what its role is’. This indicates that the coordination of cross-
sectoral policy is not seen as being important, and that the political coordination within the 
party might be given advantage before the formalized and managerial type of coordination 
on the political and administrative level.
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to ministerial level, directly chaired by the Prime Minister, which has increased 
the authority of the anti-corruption unit of the Ministry of Justice. The AC 
policy coordination exhibits features of both hierarchical type of coordination 
at the political level, and the network type of coordination at the administrative 
level (the secretariat and the coordinators in implementing bodies). Still, the 
coordination is not informal nor voluntary, but formal and obligatory, backed 
up by legal instruments of highest rank. Although the locus of coordination is 
government Commission, in practice the practical coordination rests upon the 
secretariat, what makes its capacity and political support even more important. 
With regard to Metcalfe’s typology (1994) besides the forms of negative 
coordination, the AC policy witnesses the development of more elaborated 
approach and advanced levels of coordination (7–9 levels, setting priorities 
and developing the strategy) which is, at the practical level endangered by 
frequent organisational changes, low organisational capacities, and changes 
of the strength of political support towards the common goal.
3.3.3 The E-Government Policy
The e-government is usually defined as the use of internet to deliver 
services and information to citizens and businesses. The implementation 
of e-government projects is expected to create public value with regard 
to the increased efficiency and effectiveness, greater accountability and 
transparency, and overall economic and social development. At the service 
level of public administration, the e-government aims to simplify and make 
the procedures faster and less expensive and create quality services which 
are easily accessible. It rests upon the collaboration with the private sector 
for technological development and infrastructure building. In today’s digital 
economy and society, the public administration reform and policy are inevitably 
connected with the e-government policy.18 In the EU the e-government policy, 
as a part of information society policy, has started to develop already in the 
1990s (Bangeman report, 1994), but its main framework was created on the 
basis of 2000 Lisbon agenda and the vision of the EU as a knowledge society 
built on the ICT, as a promoter of employment and economic and social 
growth. The annual ministerial conferences define goals and measures on the 
basis of the strategic documents eEurope2005, eGovernment beyond 2005, 
the Initiative i2010, and the Digital agenda for Europe.
The e-government policy rests upon a coordination of various administrative 
organisations in order to create unified service to the final user. In other 
words, the e-government initiatives enable administrators to deliver services 
focusing on customers, tailored to their needs, regardless of vertical 
and horizontal fragmentation of policies included (P. 6, 2004). One-stop 
shop initiatives, e-government portals, and integrated services in general 
18 Similar to the AC policy, the e-government is a good example of policy the results of which 
are subjected to the benchmarking as a means of achieving continuous improvement (the UN 
e-government rankings, eParticipation index, the Economist’s e-government readiness index, 
etc.).
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are actually based on the coordination behind the screen, simultaneously 
facing public administration with managerial, legal, financial and democratic 
(accountability) challenges. When it comes to the coordination functions 
within e-government policy, it relates to the developing of (a) information 
infrastructures and one-stop shop centres, (b) formulating legal framework 
for e-government and information technology, (c) mobilising, prioritising 
and allocating resources for infrastructure and services and (d) monitoring, 
evaluating and communicating information, experience and ensuring 
accountability (Hanna et al., 2009). For that purpose, the coordinating 
institutions, their position in wider governance structure, political weight 
and administrative capacity are of utmost importance for the success of the 
policy.19
As in many other countries, the e-government policy in Croatia started to 
develop as part of information society policy, and later became the integral 
part of public administration reform policy.20 The development of the 
information society and e-government policy might be traced back into the 
period of the left-wing coalition government 2000–2003, although some 
sporadic efforts were made already in the 1990s.21 Within the framework 
of the Strategy – Croatia in 21 century, a first Strategy on Information and 
Communication Technology was adopted by the Government in 2002, as a 
program document, containing only 17 recommendations which had to be 
further developed by implementation bodies (within several projects – state 
administration, business, culture, international relations, housing, health 
and environmental protection). Specific e-government related activities 
were not exceptionally prominent within the strategy, because the priorities 
were related to the general informatisation and the development of the 
legal framework related to the use of the ICT and overall dedication to the 
inclusion of Croatia in the EU. The institutional framework envisaged by the 
Strategy included the National Council for Information Society Technology 
and the Parliamentary Committee for Information Society Technology as 
monitoring bodies, the coordination by the Commission for Informatisation 
(political coordination), and shared coordination by the Government Office 
For Internalisation (established in 2000) and the Ministry of Science and 
Technology. At the operative level, the activities are implemented by 
ministries and specialized agencies.
19 Hanna et al. (2009) distinguish between four models of e-government institutions – policy and 
investment coordination, where a cross-cutting ministry has the lead of the e-government 
policy (Australia, UK, US, Brazil, China), administrative coordination, where ministry of public 
administration or similar is in charge (Germany, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Mexico, Korea), technical 
coordination, where the ministry of science, technology or similar leads the policy (e.g. 
Romania, India, Singapore), and shared or no coordination (Sweden,. Russia).
20 As a result of the implementation of e-government policy, Croatia ranked 30th in the UN 
e-government survey 2012, see: http://www2.unpan.org/egovkb/
21 During 1991–1996 the institutional framework included the Institute for informatisation of 
state administration, justice and public affairs within the Ministry of justice and administration 
and the Government Commission for the informatisation of state administration, justice and 
public affairs, as coordinating bodies.
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The next stage of the development of e-government policy relates to the 
period 2003–2007 and 2008–2011. As one of the key policies of the new 
government the main strategic document for the development of information 
society in Croatia was adopted in 2003 under the title Programme e-Croatia 
2007 (for the period 2004–2007), accompanied by the Plan of implementation 
of the Programme 2007, which defined specific measures for implementation 
and the implementation and monitoring mechanism. It encompassed various 
projects and activities, focusing of four areas: e-government, e-judiciary, 
e-education and e-business.22 In addition, a specific strategy of the one stop 
shop was adopted in 2004 (Hitro.hr), focusing on the development of e-services 
on both central and regional level. The specific Strategy of E-Government was 
adopted in 2009 for the period 2009–2012, with the main goal to develop 
customer-oriented, accessible, accountable and efficient administration. The 
priorities related to the user satisfaction, rational administrative procedures 
and e-services provision. The Strategy focused on the informatisation of 
state administration and its service orientation towards users based on the 
development of ICT infrastructure in the state administration, informational 
basis, e-service accessibility and the development of human resources in 
the area of e-services provision. As main activities, the Strategy emphasised 
the interoperability framework development for the public sector and the 
interconnectedness of the state administration bodies, the development of 
the information portal, the e-office project (file management), and similar.
The main coordinating body in the period 2004–2011 was the Central 
State Office for E-Croatia (CSOEC),23 a semi-autonomous agency headed 
by the politically appointed state secretary and directly accountable to the 
Prime Minister. The main tasks of the CSOEC were the coordination and 
implementation of the Programme e-Croatia 2007 and coordination of the 
interoperability scheme for the state administration bodies, monitoring the 
implementation of the EU acquis with regard to information society, and 
advancement of the development of information infrastructure in Croatia. 
The CSOEC was an integrator and a coordinator of the network of coordinators 
for Programme implementation in state administration bodies and agencies. 
Based on the Strategy of E-government and the Croatian Interoperability 
Framework, the Council for Informatisation of State Administration was 
established in order to define and monitor the implementation of the 
Croatian interoperability framework, comprised of the state secretary of the 
CSOEC and the representatives of state administration bodies. In addition, 
as the advisory and monitoring body of the Government, The National 
Council for The Information Society was established in September 2004, 
22 Within the Programme, various projects were envisaged, such as e-treasury, e-public 
procurement, e-customs, e-taxes, e-court decisions, e-land register, e-information boards 
of the courts, integrated information system of judicial files management, e-education, and 
e-health.
23 From 2004 onwards the new type of administrative organisation closely linked to the 
government was established – central state office (later only state office) for managing 
horizontal tasks, such as e-government policy, public administration policy, strategic 
development policy, and the state property management.
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and its 14 members (representatives of the state bodies and of private sector, 
civil sector and academia) were appointed two years later (April 2006). The 
Council was headed by the State secretary of the State Office for E-Croatia 
(SOEC). The role of the National council was to analyse and define directions 
of the information society development, and to enforce implementation of 
the priority goals and measures.
At the operative level, the main bodies, except state administration bodies 
(ministries, state administrative organisations, agencies), include agencies 
implementing information society policy, such as Agency for Information 
Systems, Agency for Personal Data Protection, Agency for Electronic 
Communication. The implementation bodies were obliged to submit their 
monthly report to the CSOEC which then drafted the yearly report and 
submitted it to the Government.
In 2012 the e-government policy entered a new stage, with the Government 
coming into power at the end of 2011. In February 2012 the Government 
established the Commission for Coordination of Informatisation of Public 
Sector, a political level coordination body, comprised of the two deputy 
prime ministers, seven ministers and the assistant minister in charge for 
informatisation of public sector within the ministry of administration. The 
Commission has five working groups for administrative level coordination of 
various areas of informatisation of public sector (for registers, for electronic 
identity, for public procurement, etc.), comprised of the representatives of 
state administration bodies and agencies in the field of information society. 
The support to the Commission and the working groups is provided by the 
Ministry of Administration, which is now in charge of the activities of the 
former CSCOE which was abolished in March 2012 and became a Directorate 
for e-Croatia of the Ministry of Administration, with more elaborated scope of 
affairs, but mainly keeping its policy development and coordinative function. 
The newly established working groups, comprised of the civil servants, private 
sector representatives are expected to develop specific strategies and later 
coordinate their implementation, under the umbrella Commission.
In sum, higher political salience of the e-government policy was motivated by 
the need to make public administration more effective and less expensive in 
the situation of economic and financial crisis. As indicated by interviewees, 
the implementation of the informatisation projects in public administration 
was not successful, the interoperability was not achieved, and the citizens 
and business still do not feel significant benefits of the informatisation of 
administration and the information society in general. Although a progress 
in the development of e-government and information society in general has 
been made in previous decade, some problems remain, mostly related to 
the highly fragmented state and public administration and the fact that the 
projects are expensive and complex. As one of the interviewees noticed, the 
implementation of previous strategies and projects was hampered by the fact 
that the former CSOEC was politically weak in comparison to might ministries 
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and their ministers who were reluctant to give the Office the leading role. 
The other interviewee noticed that the National Council for Informatisation 
of State Administration (established in 2010) was also inefficient due to the 
low political weight – the state secretaries (a level below minister) were too 
weak to impose the implementation of the measures to the ministries – “it 
is not possible to connect islands with the sea”. In addition, the monitoring 
mechanism was not functioning either, since the National Council for 
Information Society established in 2004 had its last session in 2007, and did 
not bother to supervise and to steer the policy. Hence, it might be noticed 
that the e-government policy was not properly coordinated nor monitored at 
the political level. The politically stronger composition of the new Commission 
might be a solution since such composition could give more political weight 
to the issue.
In addition, administrative coordination also encountered problems. First, no 
joint budget for informatisation of public administration existed, but each 
administrative body had its own budget for informatisation, which actually 
lead to the creation of their own agendas (and spending). The problem of 
implementation might be seen at the operative level too, as some bodies did 
not see the point in putting information and documents in a speedy manner 
on the web portals, disregarding their obligations. Moreover, the weakness of 
the strategic management once again resulted with implementation problems 
– strategies lacked clear indicators of the success which could define desired 
results. Although the number of civil servants included in administrative 
coordinating body (CSOEC, now the Directorate) has continuously grown 
(to 31 employees), the longer period it had insufficient human resources 
(10–15 employees). The interviewees assess the collaboration with other state 
agencies and the private sector (Croatian Employers Union, private sector 
associations, individual companies) as being good, but mostly due to their 
professional and expert exchange and mutual dependence and respect, and 
not due to the greater activity of coordinating bodies. They underline that the 
strategies and the operative plans were developed in the partnership with 
the stakeholders (state administration, agencies, private sector, civil sector, 
academia and experts). Still, local governments were not sufficiently involved 
in the coordination activities, although they provide a substantial number of 
services, and their exclusion resulted in bigger cities and counties developing 
their own e-government policies (often with the help of the CSOEC).
Finally, the impact of the EU e-government policy and the EU accession on 
the development of the e-government policy in Croatia has been visible from 
the beginning of the policy development. Already the first strategy in 2002, 
and especially the Programme 2007 and their presentation in the media and 
political bodies were framed around two key issues – EU membership and the 
adoption of the EU information society policy in line with Lisbon agenda 2000, 
but also the anti-corruption effect of the use of ICT for the provision of public 
services. Although the measures for implementation of the strategy follow 
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the EU policy, the low effectiveness in implementation is due to the fact that 
e-government policy does not constitute the hard-law acquis which has to 
be implemented by the coercive means (negotiations chapters cover mostly 
electronic communication policy and some aspects of the legal framework 
for information society, such as electronic signature, electronic business, and 
similar), but, as a policy of negative integration, is based on the open method of 
coordination and the efforts of the countries themselves to ensure continuous 
improvement and make efforts to achieve desired goals (benchmarking of 
e-government serves as a tool for that). Still, the administrative coordinating 
body is involved in the EU coordination of e-government policy, such as the 
E-government high level group of the European Commission which is in 
charge of the implementation of the European action plan for e-government 
2011–2012. 
3.4 Discussion 
As presented by the description of the three policies – the regional 
development policy, the anti-corruption policy, and the e-government 
policy – are new policies which emerged after 2000 and are to a different 
degree related to the EU accession. On the other hand, three policies 
differ in many aspects, such as salience of the policy, type of policy, actors’ 
involvement, mechanisms used for coordination, the role of the EU in the 
policy development. However, the three policies were formulated and 
implemented in the politico-administrative system of the transition country 
where the mixture of the inherited traits of the systems and the newly 
introduced structures and functions have led to the specific outcomes of 
the coordination mechanisms and policy outputs. As presented in table 1, 
comments differences and similarities might be summed up as follows:
The regional policy is a part of economic policy, mostly vertically coordinated, 
while anti-corruption and e-government policy are cross-cutting policies 
predominately based on horizontal coordination of state level actors. The 
direction of coordination (vertical vs. horizontal) and the fact that political 
forces behind different levels (national, subnational) are pursuing their 
distinctive political (and economic) interest, have determined the process 
of policy formulation and implementation. While in the regional policy the 
most powerful actors are subnational and private sector actors, who have 
the greatest capacity to influence the outcomes, in the anticorruption policy, 
the civil society organisations, with the help of the external donors, were 
pressuring the creation of the policy. When it comes to e-government policy, 
the private sector actors were included in the policy development, having 
special interest in collaborating with the government in the ICT solutions 
development, but also as the users of government services, pressuring 
for faster and more effective administration. In all three cases the role of 
domestic experts (academia, consultants) was high, especially in the policy 
formulation stage, since government lacked their own expertise.
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With regard to the influence of the EU and the Europeanisation mechanism, 
all three policies are actually “European” policies,24 introduced after the 
2000 and developed in at least two distinctive stages – the first attempts 
to introduce the policy and coordination mechanisms were modestly 
successful, suffering from the beginner’s mistakes, with weak institutional 
framework, undeveloped strategies and questionable political support. After 
the beginning of the EU membership negotiations, a more advanced policy 
was developed, but still with the shortcomings with regard the strategic 
management, which is a generally underdeveloped administrative function in 
Croatia, as well as the modestly successful coordination mechanism. The type 
of Europeanisation (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005)25 in three policies 
is different – the regional policy is part of the formal acquis communautaire 
and its content is strongly influenced by the EU law; so, the mode of adoption 
relates to the coercive type of Europeanisation where the fulfilment of 
requirements from the negotiation chapter 10 is a prerequisite for the 
further advancement in the negotiation process (external incentives model 
with legal requirements). The anti-corruption policy of Europeanisation also 
rests upon coercive mechanism, but the instruments are more political – only 
smaller part of the policy is based on the formal acquis, and the rests is a 
matter of political evaluation of the progress (external incentives model with 
political requirements). Still, the difference between two types of external 
incentives led to the different focus of the assessment – in the regional policy 
it is an adoption of formal mechanism, which does not guarantee the desired 
outcome of the policy (shallow or formal Europeanisation), while in the case 
of the anti-corruption policy, except legally defined framework, the policy 
outcomes were assessed based on the sanctioning and criminal procedures. 
Finally, the e-government policy is a policy which is designed by the means 
of the open method of coordination, and the Europeanisation mechanism 
rests upon the combination of social learning (normative type), and lesson 
drawing (mimetic type of adoption of the policy). Since the results are hard 
to measure (and not immediate) and the benchmarking suffers from its own 
methodological problems, the general assessment of the policy success is not 
24 It is almost impossible to analyse any public policy in Croatia in the last decade without 
inclusion of the factor of the EU and its political, legal and/or financial support.
25 Schimmelfennig and Sedelemeier (2005) presents three mechanisms of Europeanisation in 
CEEs, depending on the source of change (EU or domestic level) and the contrasting logics of 
consequence (RCI) or logic of appropriateness (SI): (a) the external incentives model, based on 
the logic of consequence, when sanctions and rewards are affecting cost-benefit calculations 
of candidate countries; the carrot and stick models achieves greater explanatory power 
with the increase of net-benefits of accession and with credibility of the EU; it is based on 
conditionality – the advancement in the accession process is connected to the speed and 
pace of institutional adjustments and reforms conducted by the prospective member); (b) 
the social learning model – the change is induced by the learning process – the legitimacy of 
EU norms and identification with the EU is a factor for adaptation; this process is developed 
through intergovernmental interactions (negotiations, persuasion) or through transnational 
processes which gather societal actors (interest groups, regional authorities); finally (c) the 
lesson-drawing model explains change by national level causes – unsatisfied with domestic 
status quo, the states adopt the EU rules if they are perceived as solution for their domestic 
problems, according to the logic of consequence, or their appropriateness for institutional 
adjustment. The prevailing mode of institutional change in CEEs is explained by external 
incentive model, in other words, by “reinforcement by reward”.
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simple. Still, the content of the policy and the support in policy formulation 
and implementation is in all three cases connected to the efforts of the 
European Commission, but in the case of anti-corruption policy other actors 
and formal obligations also play significant role (Council of Europe, Un, OECD, 
World Bank), while in the case of e-government the role of international 
benchmarking and participation in the UN has an impact on the policy 
development.
With regard to the coordination structures and mechanisms, in all three 
policies strategies were adopted, first as general statement or programmatic 
documents, and later in more elaborated versions, but still lacking clear 
measures and indicators. The reluctance to develop strategies which would 
enable proper coordination might indicate not only low expertise but also 
unwillingness of politics to show genuine interest in the success of the policy 
formulation and implementation. Hence, although the policy coordination 
scale would say that the strategy is the higher level of coordination, the 
Croatian case shows that even with the strategy, the coordination may be 
insufficient. It also points towards low strategic capacity of institutions, and 
certain misinterpretation of the role of strategy. It is commonly understood 
in Croatia that the strategy relates to the document containing priorities 
and instruments for reaching certain policy goals, but this notion without 
exception excludes a proper establishment of proper organisational 
structures and resources (financial, skills) to implement, monitor and report 
on strategy. Hence, although formally one could say that three policies have 
reached the highest levels of policy coordination, in reality it is not a case. 
Main coordinating structure at the political level underwent constant changes 
– with regard to the regional policy, it was frequently changing organisational 
frame (different ministries), the anti-corruption policy was coordinated by 
ineffective commission, which was later upheld to higher political level, while 
the e-government in past really had no political coordination, except the 
symbolic one, in the person of prime minister. In 2012 the political coordination 
of regional and e-government policy became stronger, with a greater political 
salience of these issues, due to economic crisis – the regional policy is now 
(2012) situated in the special Ministry of regional development, with the 
minister being at the same time a vice prime minister, while e-government 
policy was transferred to the Ministry of administration and the coordinated 
by the government Commission for informatisation, composed by ministers. 
On the other hand, the anti-corruption policy, now that the accession 
agreement has been signed, is still in search of political coordination, and 
the fact that a great number of criminal cases are pending before Croatian 
courts, might indicate that the public believes that the policy is successful 
and the political relevance of the issue has decreased. As the experience of 
three policies shows, the greater political salience of the issue (to the extent 
that it becomes the problem number one in the political system) leads to 
the creation of political coordination structure. The public perception of 
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the problem plays a crucial role, and the public sees the sanctioning, and not 
the prevention mechanisms. In other words, the public visibility also pushes 
towards greater political steering, although in practice the political steering 
might not be always effective.
Table 1:  Coordination of three policies in Croatia
Regional development 
policy Anti-corruption policy E-government policy
policy sector
economic policy – 
regional development 
(sector policy)
cross-cutting / wicked cross-cutting
direction of 
coordination vertical and horizontal horizontal horizontal 
the role of other 
actors in policy 
formulation and 
implementation
subnational – high
private sector – high
civil sector – low
experts – moderate
subnational – low
private sector – low
civil society – high
experts – moderate
subnational – low
private sector – high
civil society – low
experts – high
the introduction of 
the policy / new policy 2001/ 2006 2002/ 2006 2002 / 2008
The EU impact
EU chapter 10 Regional 
policy
acquis
democratic institutions 
and the rule of law EU 
chapter 23 / political 
impact
EU chapter 22 
Information society
type of 
Europeanisation
external incentives 
model / formal
external incentives 
model / political
social learning / lesson 
drawing 
external actor EU – European commission
EU European commission 
Council of Europe – 
GRECO
OECD, The World Bank
European commission / 
EU information society 
policy (OMC)
UN & other global 
benchmarking
strategic documents Strategy 2009, Regional Development Law 2010
National programme 
2002 and 2006
Strategy and action plan 
2008 / revision 2010
Strategy 2002/ Strategy 
2009
main coordinating 
structure – political 
level
Government / different 
ministries, Ministry of 
regional development
Commission for AC 
strategy implementation 
(Government level)
Commission for 
informatisation 
of administration 
(Government level)
main structure – 
administrative level
different ministries, 
Ministry of regional 
development / Agency 
for regional development 
/ regional development 
agencies
Ministry of justice 
– Sector for Anti-
corruption
Central state office for 
e-Croatia (2004–2011)
Ministry of 
administration – 
Directorate for 
e-government (2012–)
coordinated 
actors (policy 
implementation)
state administration, 
agencies, regions, local 
units, private sector 
organisations
state administration 
bodies, agencies, private 
sector organisations 
state administration, 
agencies, public 
institutions (education, 
health, etc.)
the role of top civil 
servants high moderate high
The main coordinating structure at the administrative level in all three 
cases shows that the problem of capacity of the organisation and its formal 
authority to impose obligations to other coordinated organisations is of 
critical importance for the success of the policy. The great number of involved 
actors and their different interests and modus of operation impose even 
greater pressure to coordination than in traditional functional sectors, such 
as health, education, or similar, where the professionalization may serve as 
powerful coordinative instrument. As shown by the case of anti-corruption 
policy, the low capacity and the unsatisfactory position of the organisation 
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in the system prevented the agency to fulfil its role – both information 
gathering and the relations with political masters has suffered. On the 
other hand, the regional policy administrative coordination depends on the 
collaboration of central and regional administrative organisations, which, in 
turn, is defined by political interest. But, most evident case of the importance 
of the locus and the capacity of administrative coordination is the case of 
e-government policy, where the state office had problems to impose measures 
to the ministries since the office itself had the lower organisational position 
compared to the ministries.26 Hence, the combination of proper political 
support and coordination and the sufficient capacity (resources, authorities) 
of the administrative coordination is a prerequisite for effective coordination.
4 Conclusion and Future Research
In the paper the development of policy strategy and coordination mechanisms 
was presented in case of three policies in Croatia. All three policies are new, 
crosscutting, and affected by the process of Europeanisation. The cases 
presented indicate that the Croatian political and administrative system 
suffers from inefficiencies when it comes to both strategy development 
and the establishment of coordination structures which are responsible to 
implement coordinative instruments. This fact might be explained by the 
several factors: first, there is a lack of know-how and professional civil service 
which would be able to devise such instruments and to influence politicians 
into taking their advice seriously; in all three policies, the state depends on the 
inclusion of experts in the strategy drafting because of the lack of their own 
capacities (low professionalism); secondly, there is a problem for politicians 
and civil servants to understand the role of coordination and to overcome 
their habits of doing things independently; the spirit of cooperation is 
missing, indicating a cultural problem (low trust); thirdly, there is still vivid 
inherited tradition of creating strategic directions and coordinating the 
policy from the political party, and not within the formal and transparent 
mechanism of political and administrative coordination indicating a problem 
of administrative culture and the maturity of democracy; thirdly, the strong 
incentive from the EU to develop and implement policy might have led to 
the reluctance and misunderstanding of the importance of those policies for 
economic and social development which implies a shallow Europeanisation; 
as many other EU-initiatives, those policies were also seen by politicians, civil 
servants, and in the greater part of the public as something “we have to do in 
order to become a EU member” (one interviewee said). Still, in all three cases, 
the greater advancement in the policy formulation and implementation was 
a result of greater political pressure from the EU and stronger domestic 
political support. In all three cases, the administrative coordinating structures 
26 It is the same with the public administration – the central state office was in charge of public 
administration in the period 2004–2009, and in 2009 it was reorganized into special ministry, 
becoming more relevant politically.
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were slowly built, usually under-staffed, with no resources, political backing 
and without clear lines of authority and responsibility.
With regard to the levels of policy coordination (Metcalfe, 1994), the research 
indicates that the policy coordination instruments highly depend on the 
capacity of administrative structures in charge for coordination, as well as the 
political support to the strategy and priorities. Sufficiently strong coordinative 
structures allow for coordinating instruments to be effective, hence ensuring 
the policy goals attainment. In addition, the proper implementation of 
those instruments is a necessary prerequisite for coordination – conflict 
management (5 and 4), information gathering and exchange (3 and 2), and 
especially strategic management (7–9) are administrative functions which 
need properly skilled professionals as well as the institutionalisation of these 
techniques in the system. So far, they are still new and often misunderstood.
The presented analysis of three policies is a first part of the more 
comprehensive research where the more in-depth exploration of the 
coordination practices is planned, based on the qualitative and the quantitative 
research. The focus of the research would cover additional policies (public 
administration reform policy, anti-discrimination policy, regulatory reform 
policy), based on more elaborated theoretical framework. This study is 
one of rare attempts to grasp the coordination problem in Croatian public 
administration, since no comprehensive, or even more elaborated case 
studies, have been done so far.
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POVZETEK
1.01 Izvirni znanstveni članek
Koordiniranje politike v tranzicijskih državah: 
primer Hrvaške
Organizacijska teorija pravi, da specializacija kot tudi horizontalna in 
vertikalna diferenciacija upravne dejavnosti v moderni državi vodijo k večji 
potrebi po koordinaciji. Novo javno upravljanje je zaostrilo trend specializacije 
z zagovarjanjem diferenciacije, delegacije, devolucije in decentralizacije 
neodvisnih agencij, zunanjega izvajanja organizacij zasebnega sektorja 
ter privatizacije javnih storitev. Procesi fragmentacije državne uprave, 
politična decentralizacija kot tudi povečano mednarodno sodelovanje v 
okviru globalizacije in evropeizacije so povečali problem koordiniranja javnih 
politik in doseganja ciljev javne uprave. Poleg tega je vzniknilo lotevanje 
več perečih družbenih problemov znotraj novih medsektorskih politik, ki 
zadevajo obstoječa področja politik in ministrske resorje, kot so varovanje 
okolja, enakopravnost spolov, ekonomska konkurenca ali boj proti korupciji. 
Povečevanje števila avtonomnih agencij ter ločevanje političnih in upravnih 
nalog v različnih upravnih organizacijah (ministrstva v nasprotju z agencijami), 
pojav horizontalnih in medsektorskih politik kot tudi večnivojsko upravljanje so 
ustvarili ogromen pritisk na politično-upravni sistem, kar zadeva koordiniranje 
aktivnosti in organizacij za doseganje istih političnih ciljev. Odgovor na to je 
združevanje stebrov upravne dejavnosti v okviru celostnega, združevalnega 
ali holističnega upravljanja.
Problem koordinacije je posebej pomemben pri formulaciji in implementaciji 
posamezne politike. Nezadostna koordinacija med političnimi deležniki v 
procesu formuliranja politike in neuspešna koordinacija implementacijskih 
aktivnosti se lahko označita kot glavni problem politike. Obstaja več dimenzij 
koordiniranja politik, ki vključujejo razlike med pozitivnimi in negativnimi 
vidiki koordinacije, med vertikalnimi in horizontalnimi linijami koordinacije, 
med kratkoročnimi in dolgoročnimi vidiki doseganja koherentnosti političnih 
ciljev ter politično in upravno koordinacijo. Ker mehanizem upravljanja ni 
enovito telo, ampak je sestavljeno iz organizacij, ki so v različni meri vzajemno 
medsebojno povezane, se izvajanje koordiniranja odraža v učinkoviti interakciji 
med različnimi stranemi v prizadevanju za skupno delovanje k skupnemu cilju. 
Pri tem politično koordiniranje vključuje različne procedure in strukture, kot 
so učinkovit svetovalni sistem in vloga politične ekspertize v vladnem uradu, 
vloga kabinetnih odborov pri koordiniranju politik, ustanovitev osrednjih 
agencij, koordinacijska prizadevanja med ministrstvi in še mnoge druge 
oblike. V literaturi se široko uporablja Metcalfeova klasifikacija političnega 
koordiniranja, ki se ukvarja s hierarhično razvitimi fazami političnega 
koordiniranja in ki meri sposobnost koordinacije z devetimi dimenzijami.
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V demokracijah v razvoju je problem političnega koordiniranja še bolj očiten. 
Graditev ustreznih koordinacijskih struktur in razvijanje instrumentov 
koordiniranja sta bila med glavnimi elementi državnih in upravnih reform. 
Podedovani koordinacijski mehanizmi, ki so temeljili na prehodu od odločanja 
komunistične partije k odločanju državnih institucij prek politično imenovanih 
oseb v političnih telesih in upravi, se niso mogli odzvati na novo politično, 
družbeno in ekonomsko okolje v tranzicijskem obdobju ter procese odpiranja 
družbi, demokratizacije, evropeizacije in internacionalizacije. Problem 
koordiniranja politike v fazah formulacije in implementacije utegne biti 
povezan tudi s pomanjkanjem (ali z odsotnostjo) strateškega upravljanja 
v vladi. V novem političnem in ekonomskem kontekstu je vzniknila potreba 
po razvoju in institucionalizaciji koordinacijskih struktur in funkcij, ki bi 
horizontalno in vertikalno povezale upravljanje ter zagotovile pregledno in 
učinkovito sprejemanje in uveljavljanje odločitev.
Koordiniranje je postalo pomembno tudi v Hrvaški, eni od vzhodnoevropskih 
tranzicijskih držav in novi članici EU-ja (od leta 2013). Sistem političnega 
koordiniranja na Hrvaškem na splošno trpi zaradi več institucionalnih in 
strukturnih primanjkljajev, kot so pomanjkanje osrednje enote za razvoj 
politike, šibka politična ekspertiza, formalizacija procedur, odsotnost stabilne 
in transparentne sheme razreševanja razlik med ministrstvi ter zlasti šibka 
ex-ante koordinacija med ministrstvi. 
Raziskava, predstavljena v tem članku, je osredotočena na opis koordiniranja 
v treh ločenih politikah na Hrvaškem – v regionalni razvojni politiki, proti-
korupcijski politiki in politiki e-uprave – v obdobju pred članstvom v EU-ju. To 
so nove politike, ki so nastale po letu 2000 in so v različni meri povezane s 
pristopanjem k EU-ju, izkazujejo pa značilnosti medsektorskih politik. Po drugi 
strani se te tri politike razlikujejo v mnogih vidikih, kot so ugled politike, vrsta 
politike, udeležba akterjev, mehanizmi, ki se uporabljajo za koordinacijo, 
ter vloga EU-ja pri razvoju politike. Poseben poudarek je namenjen 
razvoju političnih in upravnih struktur koordinacije, akterjem, vključenim v 
koordiniranje politik, ter vplivu EU-ja na razvoj in uspešnost koordinacije.
Podatki, pridobljeni z intervjuji ter pravno in politično analizo, kažejo, da na 
najvišjih upravnih in političnih ravneh še naprej obstaja problem koordinacije. 
Regionalna politika je del ekonomske politike in je večinoma vertikalno 
koordinirana, medtem ko sta protikorupcijska politika in politika e-uprave 
medsektorski politiki, kjer prevladuje horizontalno koordiniranje akterjev na 
državni ravni. Smer koordiniranja (vertikalna nasproti horizontalni) in dejstvo, 
da politične sile za različnimi ravnmi (nacionalno, subnacionalno) zasledujejo 
svoje ločene politične (in ekonomske) interese, določata proces oblikovanja 
in uveljavljanja politik. Medtem ko so pri regionalni politiki najmočnejši 
subnacionalni akterji in akterji zasebnega sektorja, ki imajo največjo sposobnost 
vplivanja na rezultate, pa pri protikorupcijski politiki pritisk na oblikovanje in 
uveljavljanje politike izvajajo organizacije civilne družbe ob pomoči zunanjih 
donatorjev. V razvoj politike e-uprave so vključeni akterji zasebnega sektorja, 
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ki imajo poseben interes za sodelovanje z vlado pri razvoju ICT rešitev, a 
tudi kot uporabniki upravnih storitev, ki podpirajo spremembe za hitrejšo 
in učinkovitejšo upravo. V vseh treh primerih močno vlogo igrajo domači 
strokovnjaki (znanstveniki, svetovalci), še zlasti v fazi oblikovanja politik, saj 
ima vlada premalo lastnih strokovnjakov. Na vse tri politike je vplivala EU z 
dvema ločenima fazama – prvi poizkusi za uvedbo političnih in koordinacijskih 
mehanizmov so bili zmerno uspešni; pestile so jih začetniške napake, imeli so 
šibek institucionalni okvir, nerazvite strategije in vprašljivo politično podporo. 
Po začetku pogajanj o članstvu v EU-ju je bila razvita bolj izpopolnjena 
politika, vendar še vedno pomanjkljiva pri strateškem upravljanju in z zmerno 
uspešnim koordinacijskim mehanizmom. Toda pritisk EU-ja je bil različen – 
od formalnega pritiska pri regionalni politiki za oblikovanje in uveljavitev 
strateškega in pravnega okvira do političnega pritiska pri protikorupcijski 
politiki in precejšnjega manevrskega prostora za uveljavitev politike e-uprave. 
Glede na koordinacijske strukture in mehanizme so bile pri vseh treh 
politikah sprejete strategije, najprej v obliki splošne izjave ali programskih 
dokumentov, kasneje v bolj izdelanih verzijah, a še vedno ob pomanjkanju 
jasnih meril in kazalnikov. Nepripravljenost za razvoj strategij, ki bi omogočile 
ustrezno koordinacijo, lahko kaže ne le na šibko strokovnost in pomanjkljivosti 
v strateškem upravljanju, temveč tudi na nepripravljenost politike, da bi 
izkazala iskreno zanimanje za uspešnost oblikovanja in uveljavljanja politik. 
Čeprav bi torej z lestvice političnega koordiniranja izhajalo, da je strategija 
višja raven koordinacije, hrvaški primer kaže, da je lahko kljub obstoju 
strategije koordinacija nezadostna. Nakazuje tudi nizko strateško sposobnost 
institucij in določeno napačno interpretiranje vloge strategije. Razen tega so 
se politične in upravne strukture koordiniranja pogosto spreminjale, kar je 
negativno vplivalo na uspešnost politike. Kljub temu hkrati doseženi napredek 
kaže, da večja politična pomembnost vprašanja pozitivno vpliva na razvoj 
koordinacijske strukture na politični ravni in močnejšega političnega vodenja 
in verjetno prispeva tudi k večji uspešnosti politike.
